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Structured Abstract  
Purpose: Psychological and epidemiological literature suggests that the built 
environment plays both causal and salutary roles in schizophrenia, so what are the 
implications for designers?  
Methodology: A translational exploration of the epidemiological, neurological and 
psychological research that relates to the dynamics between the built environment and 
psychotic illness.  
Findings: The built environment is conceived as being both an agonist and as an 
antagonist for the underlying processes that present as psychosis. The built 
environment is implicated through several means: Through the opportunities it 
provides. These may be physical, narrative, emotional, hedonic or personal. Some 
opportunities may be negative, and others positive. The built environment is also an 
important source of unexpected aesthetic stimulation, yet in psychotic illnesses, 
aesthetic sensibilities characteristically suffer from deterioration.  
This paper focuses on the role the built environment has in environmental × 
psychological dynamics, in order that deleterious effects can be avoided and 
beneficial effects emphasised in architectural design. 
Limitations and implications: The findings presented are based on research that is 
largely translated from very different fields of enquiry. Whilst findings are cogent and 
logical, much of the support is correlational rather than empirical.  
Social implications: The WHO claims that schizophrenia destroys 24 million lives 
worldwide, with an exponential effect on human and financial capital. It is only partly 
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manageable with medicine, and because evidence implicates the built environment, 
the onus is on architectural and urban designers to reduce the human costs wrought by 
the illness.  
Originality/value: Never before has architecture been so explicitly implicated as a 
cause of mental illness. This paper was presented to the Symposium of Mental Health 
Facility Design, and is essential reading for anyone involved in designing for 
improved mental health. 
Acknowledgements: This work was supported by the Schizophrenia Research 
Institute, utilising infrastructure funding from the NSW Department of Health.
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Lost in Space: The place of the architectural milieu in  
the aetiology and treatment of schizophrenia. 
The search for evidence on which to base the design of psychiatric facilities is an 
important endeavour. But psychiatric illness isn’t like orthopaedics or cardiology, 
where the nature of the illness has nothing much do with the environment except 
perhaps that it may provide opportunities for fitness or injury. In contrast, the 
environment is repeatedly found to be a very significant factor in the psychogenesis of 
mental illnesses – especially with non-affective psychoses. This article is a theoretical 
discussion about the evidence and how conclusions may be drawn from the patterns 
we can observe.  
Mental illnesses should not be thought of as homogenous. They share some 
similarities, but also have some very significant differences. In some cases, 
interventions that promote well-being in one disorder may do the opposite in another 
(Pei et al., 2010). In fact, not only are mental disorders heterogeneous, the symptoms 
that they present with are, too (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
Hallucinations, for example, range from very normal experiences through to utterly 
bizarre and frightening ones. Hay (1994) reports that as many as 60% of people will 
have experiences that could be classed as hallucinatory, if religious and numinous 
experience were to be counted. ‘Normal’ hallucinations, and those associated with 
dementia are often meaningful and are usually experienced in a single modality – a 
person may ‘see’ a deceased relative or angels, for instance. Shizotypal experience, on 
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the other hand, is far less common: it is usually out of control, is malevolent and most 
often multimodal – a patient may have the visual and aural experience of having God 
appear on the TV to command them to commit suicide, for instance (Golembiewski, 
in review-b, Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994). 
Despite the complexities of mental illnesses, the current evidence available to 
direct design decision-making is mundane, predictable and offers very little insight 
into the phenomenal impacts of the design. The papers that have been published take 
a few distinct methodologies, and all have limitations, particularly when it comes to 
understanding findings. Some are based on post-occupancy studies of units that have 
been renovated (Eg. Sloan Devlin, 1992, Vaaler et al., 2005, Hurst, 1960). These 
cannot extend beyond the working principles of the design team and are further 
limited by the evaluation criteria of the post-occupancy assessors. Another 
methodology is when design is driven by expert opinions rather than identifiable 
empirical support (Eg. Davis et al., 1979, Foley and Lacy, 1967, Gutkowski et al., 
1992, Gross et al., 1998, Osmond, 1966, Osmond, 1958, Osmond, 1957).  
Some researchers seeking design solutions ask the patients. This approach has 
been effective, but with qualifications. Valid questions hover over the usefulness of 
patient opinions when patients are typically confused about basic reality. Also, all 
patient cohorts cannot be represented – the more critical patients who have ‘lost touch 
with reality,’ (the disorganised or catatonic type schizophrenic patients in particular) 
are unlikely to give meaningful answers at all, whereas it may be hard to stop patients 
with manic disorders. For this reason, patient questionnaires are rarely used. Where 
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useful findings can be uncovered using this approach, they lack depth and insight into 
the dynamics of the environment on the syndrome’s aetiology. Instead they tend to 
gauge patient satisfaction with one choice or another (Middelboe et al., 2001) (Eg. 
Perkins, in review, Barnhart, 1996, Larsen, 1992). As examples, Barnhart (1996) 
found that schizophrenic patients generally prefer garden settings than constructed 
ones  and Larsen (1992) found that schizophrenic patents preferred garden settings 
that were extremely naturalistic, highly enclosed by shrubbery and extremely complex 
in contrast to controls who preferred more open gardens, less complexity and more 
manicured gardens.  
Another approach in the literature is to inform design through systematic 
referral to models of health, illness, stress and psychosocial needs. These methods 
provide a welcome richness for designers, because they focus on principles, not 
specifics. These methods can be limited by specificity. Is a study on an Alzheimer’s 
unit applicable to schizophrenia for instance? The neurology, symptoms and apparent 
phenomenology of Alzheimer’s dementia is extremely different from schizophrenia, 
so the applicability of Zeisel’s studies on the environments for Alzheimer’s patients 
(Zeisel, 2005, Zeisel, 2007, Zeisel and Raia, 2000, Zeisel et al., 2003) cannot be 
naïvely superimposed. Even so, some of the eight principles and sixteen dimensions 
of Alzheimer’s care of (Zeisel) must remain relevant. This draws us toward another 
approach: the development of design principles that transcend the specifics of 
illnesses, and are based on models of sickness and health. Examples include: Lawton 
and Nahemow (1973), Golembiewski (2010), Kaplan (1995), but where focusing on 
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specific disorders may be too specific, the principles approach may be too 
generalised. 
The approach taken here is not to address problem behaviour (ie. Boredom, 
getting lost, wandering etc.) but to identify specific aspects of the built environment 
that appear to be aetiologically related to psychosis, so designers may understand how 
the built environment actually fosters psychotic experience.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Attempts to alleviate the symptoms of schizophrenia by altering the built environment 
reflect widely held hypotheses that perception is dysfunctional in schizophrenia 
(Fletcher and Frith, 2009, Kapur, 2003, Kapur et al., 2005, Searles, 1960). These 
beliefs are supported by the prevalence of hallucinations in 73% (n=980) of diagnoses 
(Castle et al., 2006) and by a general lack of responsiveness in others (69%, n=935 
(McGrath et al., 2009)). Attempts to improve symptoms by altering environments are 
not uncommon, but are usually guided by naïve models of perception. Changing 
finishes does not change the way things are perceived. A green-coloured bicycle is 
functionally no different from a peach-coloured one and likewise, peach or green 
paint on the walls of a day-room cannot change the walls in a meaningful way, even if 
it does make the place noticeably more cheerful to a healthy visitor. Yes, replicated 
evidence does suggest that interior decorations, if significant enough, may improve 
mental health outcomes, lower vandalism rates, and shorten stays (Ulrich and 
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Parsons, 1990, Sloan Devlin, 1992, Hurst, 1960, Vaaler et al., 2005). These outcomes 
are welcome, and these innovations may guide designers to make better choices, but 
choices may be improved further because superficial approaches are unlikely to affect 
the psychogenesis that underlies psychotic states.  
It’s heretical to suggest that the built environment has a causal effect on 
schizophrenia, but the facts are bare: when other known factors are discounted – 
‘urbanicity’ at the time of birth correlates to an increase in schizophrenia incidence by 
28-34.3% (above the null hypothesis), once genetic factors have been discounted 
(Kelly et al., 2010). Furthermore, epidemiological studies consistently point to a 
similar figure – assuming that all other factors are even. Data from meta-analyses 
suggest that urbanicity at any time of life correlates with a 48% increase in 
schizophrenia incidence. The figure remains reliably high, at around 30% (once again, 
once other known factors have been discounted) on an exposure = dose basis. This 
number is one of the highest and most stable epidemiological factors for 
schizophrenia (van Os, 2004). Ultimately, this builds a compelling argument that the 
urban environment has a causal effect on psychotic conditions.  
The principle has been tested but the reasons remain illusive: A ten minute 
walk through the dilapidated, but busy Camberwell High Street (South London) 
demonstrates a significant effect on a battery of psychological tests, including 
Positive And Negative Symptoms Scores (PANSS) (anxiety t (14) = –3.57 (p = 
0.003); and paranoia t = –2.69 (p = 0.017, negative scores represent deterioration) 
(Ellett et al., 2008).  
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The finger points squarely at the urban environment, but what features of the 
environment are culpable? Is the urban environment itself a problem, or is it a proxy 
for something else? Can ‘urbanicity’ stand in for particular social mores, for the 
prevalence of the built environment, for indoor living? For the psychic pressure of too 
many people? For richness of opportunity?  
Attempts to identify specific environmental psycho-agonists have looked at 
gene × environment interactions (van Os et al., 2010, van Os et al., 2008), and at 
social dynamics (Selten and Cantor-Graae, 2007) and (Collip et al., 2008) suggest that 
the urban environment may represent a concentration of both these factors and more: 
an increased likelihood of exposure to whatever it is that a patient is sensitised to. 
This approach seems wise, but it still fails to identify anything specific. The key to 
identifying environmental psycho-agonists (at the level of detail required by 
designers) is in the relationship between perception and action. 
 
ECOLOGICAL PERCEPTION:  
understanding the action/behaviour expressway. 
Mental illnesses are not defined by pathology, but by behavioural symptoms. If the 
symptoms aren’t disingenuous, then symptoms must be the expressions of a state of 
mind and reflect natural responses to perceived stimuli, whether they are 
hallucinatory or real. Certainly delusions (the most prevalent symptom in 
schizophrenia at 87%, n=1175 (McGrath et al., 2009)) are best understood as being 
7 
very genuine expressions of a state of mind that is informed by a perceptual bias 
(Garety and Freeman, 1999). But how can perception be so disordered that a patient 
can, in all honesty, mistake people for trees or genuinely believe that the TV is 
broadcasting messages personally to them?  
In order to understand schizophrenic experience, we must first abandon naïve 
models of perception. Even a lot of scientific literature makes the mistake of 
assuming that perception is a process where colour, shape, texture and other qualia 
(sensory information; colours smells etc.) are separated and recombined in the mind 
to form the objects of knowledge, but this is not a tenable position. We simply cannot 
have the computing power to recognise every perception from all available data 
(Clark, 2012 - in press). Certainly this process must occur in healthy perception 
wherever objects are unrecognisable, but in most instances, perception is direct and 
active. One of the best models for understanding this kind of perception is the 
Ecological Theory of Perception. This theory doesn’t immediately promise all the 
answers to the complex questions surrounding psychotic illness, but it does provide 
valuable insight into phenomenology – the presumed basis for psychotic experience. 
The principle is that we perceive ‘affordances;’ opportunities to engage and to act in 
well-learned or instinctive ways (Bargh and Dijksterhuis, 2001). The cue-behaviour 
dynamic occurs in a very mechanical way – much as a transplanted heart will 
automatically start thumping when exposed to warm blood. We notice (and involve 
ourselves with) things we can directly recognise, manipulate and use (For empirical 
evidence, see Gibson, 1979). Meanwhile, colours, sounds and other raw sense data are 
easily missed or immediately forgotten.  
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Superficial changes do not affect the opportunities a space provides. People act when 
they recognise affordances, and while colour and shape information may make an 
affordance more or less recognisable, people do not act on qualia (sense information) 
as such. The primary task of perception is to initiate action (Gibson, 1979, Bargh and 
Dijksterhuis, 2001). There are different types of affordances and each has its own 
lexica of action-responses. Although not all are relevant to architecture as such, they 
all become relevant to the dynamics within the designed milieu.  
EMOTIONAL AFFORDANCES: Some perceptions have direct emotional (affective) 
meaning. This kind of engagement is very important for humans, with humour 
automatically soliciting laughter, friendship soliciting happiness, betrayal soliciting 
anger, and disappointment soliciting resentment etc. But psychotic conditions often 
prevent emotional affordances from eliciting a normal range of responses. This is 
particularly so for those with affective psychoses such as bipolar type 1 disorder or 
symptoms of paranoia (note that paranoid schizophrenia is a technical term that does 
not necessarily denote the presence of paranoia as such (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994)). When affective-spectrum psychotic patients are exposed to 
circumstances that are rich in emotional affordances, the results correlate to the 
diagnostic symptoms.  
This was found by observing 17 psychotic patients (catatonic schizophrenia, n=3; 
akinetic type 1 bipolar disorder, n=7; paranoid schizophrenia, n=3; and type 1 bipolar 
1, n=7) and ten healthy controls. All subjects had their frontal cortices scanned using 
functional magnetic resource (fMRI) imaging methods at the same time as they were 
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shown a series of pictures. Some showed negative content and others positive. One 
finding was that the psychiatric patients showed very aberrant activation and 
inhibition patterns when compared to the controls (Northoff et al., 2004). Another was 
more specific: where the healthy controls perfectly balanced their neural excitations 
and inhibitions in response to the negative images, the patients neural reactions were 
out of control. Aberrant excitation correlates with excessive thought and activity. And 
where healthy controls showed some control for the positive images, the psychiatric 
patients showed excessive inhibition, indicating that they were unable to ‘let go’ and 
enjoy a healthy experience. These dysfunctional perceptual reactions appear to 
explain a wide range of psychotic symptoms including stereotypy and negative 
thinking patterns (Golembiewski, 2012a). 
Emotional affordances are, by and large embodied in the social environment 
(including pets), but they are also to be found within the arts. The emotional 
affordances are the product of aesthetic qualities such as beauty and sublimity. Since 
antiquity beauty has been recognised as a quality of architecture (Vitrivius, circa 
15BC) – although the last century has largely disposed of this legacy. Other arts, 
including the visual arts and music remain very important sources for emotional 
affordances.  
HEDONIC AFFORDANCES: Anything that is known to stimulate hedonic pleasure 
can become a hedonic affordance. These include substances: ‘recreational’ drugs and 
alcohol; and behaviours: gambling, sex, and sometimes theft and violence. In the 
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context of health facilities, violent behaviour is a significant issue, but other habitual 
behaviours are largely prevented through lack of opportunity.  
Among healthy people, the moderation imposed by neural inhibition renders 
many hedonic affordances acceptable but without healthy neural inhibition, the use of 
hedonic stimulants becomes a mental illness in its own right, commonly known as an 
abuse or addiction (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, Golembiewski, in 
review-a).  
PHYSICAL AFFORDANCES: A very common symptom of schizophrenia is that 
patients will drink from a glass of that is presented to them, even if they aren’t thirsty. 
The symptom seems innocuous, but the subsequent overconsumption of water has 
been associated with acutely low sodium levels and there have been published 
hypotheses suggesting that this may be the cause of schizophrenia (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994, Wyatt et al., 1988, Reeves, 2004). While this 
hypothesis is simplistic and untenable, the symptom draws attention the lack of 
control that patients demonstrate around physical affordances. Physical compulsions 
are common in a range of organic neurological disorders (Lhermitte et al., 1986). The 
presence of a syringe solicits a jab, a gun solicits a shot and flowers solicit smelling 
and picking (Lhermitte, 1986). Louis Kahn also observed that building materials have 
intrinsic affordances: a brick wants to be built into an arch (1982).  
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Environments may be rich or starved of such affordances, and if affordances are 
negative, that might be a good thing, but if they are positive, the result is at best a 
missed opportunity, and at worst contribute to the pathogenesis of the illness. 
 
IDENTIFICATION AFFORDANCES: Another critical area where the designed 
environment plays a part in schizophrenia is in the formation of the sense-of-self. 
There is no consensus about what creates a holistic sense-of-self, but whatever it is, 
one of the most alarming phenomena in schizophrenia is that the sense-of-self is lost 
(Kean, 2009, Sass and Parnas, 2001, Searles, 1966). Symptomatically this is classed 
as a bizarre delusion that is particularly characteristic of schizophrenia (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). Delusions are mostly the product of too much top-
down intention in the perceptual process (Startup et al., 2008), but other signs - 
bizarreness and a general resistance to anti-psychotic medication (Buckley and Stahl, 
2007) suggest the involvement of bottom-up attentional deregulation (Golembiewski, 
in review-b). 
A number of prominent theories emphasize the effect that personal choice has 
in the formation of a sense-of-self, although there is considerable dispute about why 
we make those choices etc, (Eg. Bem, 1967, Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959, Deci and 
Ryan, 1991 (1990)). Mechanics aside, choice of action itself is universally accepted as 
being important in establishing a sense-of-self. But the sense-of-self is absent when 
choices are automatic. You don’t choose how to bring a cup to your lip, nor do you 
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peg your identity on this action. You don’t choose how to drive either (once these 
basic functions have been learned), and if you did, it would be a signal to others that 
the way you drive is an important expression of self. While automatic choices may 
define others’ impressions of you, your sense-of-self is defined by the choices you 
make, and by the choices you choose not to make.  
The designed environment is possibly the most prominent context for personal 
choice making, in this regard it is likely to eclipse the social environment in 
importance – after all, the designed and constructed environment is ubiquitous, 
whereas the social environment comes and goes. The constructed environment can 
therefore be understood as being an important domain for self-discovery and therefore 
for the establishment of a sense-of-self. Choices abound in the negotiation of the built 
environment and many of them are definitively associated with the sense-of-self. 
Many of these choices revolve around affordances. What we choose to do, given the 
opportunity. The major product is what we call ‘home’. 
In a diminished environment, alternatives (and therefore choices) are 
restricted. The choice to sit in front of the television is usually hardly a choice at all, if 
there’s nothing else to do. Television may even be harmful because it trains passivity 
in the face of virtual opportunities and also a sense of unlikely narrative through the 
storylines of television shows, and this may structurally reinforce delusional patterns 
of thought (see below). 
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NARRATIVE AFFORDANCES: Paranoid psychotic patients (the most common 
subtype of the psychotic spectrum) have a predisposition (a trait, perhaps) to believe 
that a narrative is being constructed around them and in most cases they are the 
unwitting protagonist (Gallagher, 2007). These delusional narratives hold that all 
events ultimately relate to the self. Delusions are nearly ubiquitous in schizophrenia, 
with paranoid delusions: 87%, n = 1163, grandiose delusions: 55%, n = 1103 and an 
unmeasured level of crossover (McGrath et al., 2009). Exposure to any place with 
strong symbolic loadings and omens of impending disaster or evil must stimulate 
these delusions – and such omens will be concentrated wherever people an their 
symbols are concentrated: whether it be the glint in someone’s eye, an unusual 
concentration of police or the odd name of a street.  
It only occurred to me that some environments might be particularly loaded 
with negative or grandiose narrative affordances when I was tracing the steps covered 
by the Camberwell walk study (discussed above). Firstly it should be noted that this 
area is known for its extremely high incidence of schizophrenia – as much as 9 times 
the incidence of areas that are nearby (Kirkbride et al., 2006). My methodology was 
not scientific, and cannot be reported as such, but the route did cross an Orpheus 
Street (figure 1), pass the Pre-Loved store (figure 2), and went past several signs from 
the Black Katz real estate agent (figure 3). In one place there was a gathering of at 
least thirty police. These examples are just a few of many more odd and suggestive 
narrative cues that I experienced in my ten-minute walk. Other notable non-verbal 
omens I saw included stray dogs, graffiti, pits in the street, ladders leaning over 
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walkways, Zeus brand motorbike helmets, and ominous posters for games and 
superhero movies, and a number of extreme an cultish looking places of worship. 
Exactly what triggers a delusional quest shall not be discussed here, but once 
it has commenced, there’s little doubt that the urban environment will contain more 
salient stimuli in which emotionally, physically and narrative cues are present. 
Without robust inhibition, these will exacerbate delusional beliefs and hallucinations 
(for an explanation see Golembiewski, 2012a). It has not been tested, but this alone 
seems sufficient to explain complex patterns of schizophrenia incidence, particularly 
the increase in urban areas as compared to rural ones. A rural lifestyle is simply going 
to be less symbolically loaded, more regular, and more benevolent in general.  
Given the richness in urban narrative subject matter, it seems that a rural 
setting could be salutary for patients, simply because of the decreased concentration 
of these agonists. Thinking along these lines precedes the ‘sensitisation hypothesis’ 
by over two hundred and fifty years, and has taken form in some archetypal asylums: 
the York Retreat and the Kirkbride units that were constructed in the nineteenth 
Century (Yanni, 2007). But confusingly, circumstantial evidence demonstrates that 
schizophrenic patients like being in the city. Healing the country may be, but 
schizophrenic patients show a tendency to drift into the 24/7 red light areas of the big 
metropolises, where they sleep rough in doorways, traffic islands and in areas often 
recognised for the highest levels of substance induced violence. Psychiatric migration 
isn’t huge, but what there is, flows to the centre rather than into the more calming 
environments of small towns and the country. A traditional (but still current) 
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argument links this psychiatric migration to poverty (Read, 2010). But where city 
centres were once cheap, the opposite is usually the case now, and yet wanderers still 
roll in. So another hypothesis is proposed: that the frenetic action of inner city life 
may provide comfort, much as others need quiet and security. And although frenetic 
city life may indeed increase the symptoms, it may also provide relief to a particularly 
troubling symptom, the loss of the means to experience reality partly free from 
troubling delusions and hallucinations. To understand this phenomenon, it’s necessary 
to look at another aspect of perception: this time at selective attention theory.  
 
SELECTIVE ATTENTION 
The perceptual psychology cannon allows for two kinds of attention: bottom-up and 
top-down. Bottom-up attention is drawn to stimuli that are unexpected and unsought, 
and top-down attention is given to expected or intended phenomena. Affordances 
(discussed above) are perceived through top-down attention, along with any 
experiences that are in line with on-going thought patterns and well-learned 
behaviours. Enquiry (rather than action) is triggered by bottom-up attention. Thus 
action-responses to bottom-up perceptions are not automatic. Events that draw 
bottom-up attention beg questions. Unusual opportunities, awe and unexpected 
experiences are brought to attention by bottom-up processes.  
Where top-down attention is stimulated very easily and requires little stimuli, 
bottom-up attention requires more momentous events to draw attention. These include 
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significant mismatches with normal expectations, sudden contrasts and prominent 
sense data and information (Golembiewski, in review-b, Theeuwes et al., 1998).   
Both the bottom-up and top-down modes of attention appear to be moderated 
by dopamine (Grace et al., 2007), a neurotransmitter that is dysfunctional in 
schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease, depression and most other mental illnesses.  
Errors in top-down attention processing correlate with the so-called ‘positive 
symptoms;’ these are delusions, hallucinations, disorganised speech and thought and 
grossly disorganised behaviour (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Bottom-up 
attentional dysfunctions also correlate to disorganised speech and behaviour, but even 
more so to the ‘negative signs’ the noticeable absences of normal behaviour that are 
very difficult to treat pharmacologically (Golembiewski, in review-b).  
What this means in schizophrenia, is that prominent, awesome or unexpected 
things tend to be missed, even when they are plainly obvious. Bottom-up attention 
deficits are not easy to observe as an outsider, but may account for the more severe 
and troubling symptoms of schizophrenia and other mental illnesses. These deficits 
present a whole host of problems, not least of all a tendency to miss evidence that 
contradicts delusional reasoning (Broome et al., 2007). The inability to engage with 
awe (even if only occasionally) is possibly sufficient to cause depression, debilitate 
good judgement, erode a sense of well-being and contract the perception of time, so 
that it always feel like it’s running out (Rudd et al., 2012). Other bottom-up 
perception abilities are even more critical; the ability to listen to endogenous signals 
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that tell us we’re hungry, tired, happy or miserable, the signals that guide us socially 
and monitor whether our behaviour is appropriate or not, etc.  
Deficits of bottom-up attention seem to give rise to very worrisome 
symptoms. Social dysfunction, isolation, hunger and confusion can all be traced to 
this deficit.  Therefore hypothesis that schizophrenic migration to the bus-stops in the 
red-light districts of metropolises may be in order to elicit external stimulation 
becomes highly tenable.  
Facility designers should be aware that end users with bottom-up attention 
deficits will be especially prone to accidents, getting lost and a general obliviousness 
to abstract and aesthetic concerns such as time and beauty (Golembiewski, in review-
b). But equally so, environments that don’t challenge bottom-up attention with the 
possibility of error and opportunities for discovery and aesthetic stimulation may only 
make bottom–up attention deficits worse. So a careful balance is required - improved 
safety measures and way-finding will be essential, but must be balanced with 
aesthetic generosity, lighting that reinforces diurnal rhythms and a richness of 
opportunities to act in a fulfilling and positive way.  
The oversensitivity of top-down attention (the mechanism that brings things to 
attention because they are anticipated) is ubiquitous in psychotic conditions (Kapur, 
2003, Fletcher and Frith, 2009). 
18 
The combination of top-down oversensitivity and bottom-up attentional 
deficiency exacerbates persecutory or grandiose delusions because patients will 
overvalue unimportant, but expected perceptions (Chadwick, 1992, Freeman and 
Freeman, 2008) while missing contrary facts. This phenomena, known as a 
confirmation bias, is very common even outside of mental illness, but in paranoid 
states it is ubiquitous (Nickerson, 1998, Broome et al., 2007). Most people with face-
to-face experience with schizophrenic and bipolar type I patients recognise this 
syndrome and recall patients who may be standing there, wearing two left shoes, 
claiming that they have re-cognised Einstein’s theory of relativity. The patient’s 
claims are reinforced by top-down oversensitivity (false ‘eureka experiences’) while 
oblivious of something obviously amiss is a product of bottom-up attention 
deficiencies.  
Where a patient’s delusions and hallucinations are often a worry for other 
people, they contribute to a sense of comprehensibility for the patient themselves – at 
least the patient is sure about what’s going on and why (even when they’re wrong) 
(Bergman et al., 2012). This knowledge may not be much use to negotiate the world, 
but it does add to an overall sense of coherence, and that is certainly beneficial 
(Golembiewski, 2012b) and delusions should not be treated as a problem, but as 




BRINGING THE THEORY TO PRAXIS  
the architectural milieu 
When discussing opportunities to address schizophrenic dysfunction with 
architecture, a caveat is required. Any changes to safety, security and operational 
systems need to reflect and parallel changes to the model of care. Furthermore, 
support from all stakeholders should also be in place (Plsek and Wilson, 2001). There 
can be no doubt that security and operational features are essential for the function of 
a psychiatric facility and arguments against their removal will include fears that 
opportunities for self-harm, violence and vandalism may increase. Having said this, 
the possibility that safety concerns are in conflict with health issues is also real 
(Chrysikouin this issue, Bowers et al., 2010), and in the interests of good practice, 
must be discussed with all stakeholders in a frank and open way. Some patients are 
not at risk of suicide, and others are. Patients are individuals and so are their 
circumstances (For a review of specific factors see Bowers et al., 2010). Some 
provisions that are essential for one patient will be detrimental for another, and as 
such, a diversity of spaces and provisions should be designed for. Alternatively, units 
should be customised for the individual conditions that they are to treat.  
ADDRESSING BOTTOM-UP ATTENTION DEFICITS 
If bottom-up atrophy can be successfully addressed, the deficit signs of schizophrenia 
will definitively show improvement. As it stands, pharmacological treatment for the 
deficit signs is “at best modest… results have been largely disappointing.” (Buckley 
and Stahl, 2007), This leaves a huge onus on alternative treatments, including 
20 
improved environments. How bottom-up attention may be stimulated in a positive 
way without stimulating top-down attention is a difficult problem.  
Converging lines of evidence suggest deficits of bottom-up attention are partly 
caused by the built environment, but there’s little doubt that the same symptoms 
diminish an architect’s toolkit to deal with it. In Bottom-up attentional deficiencies 
mean that prominent design features may simply not be noticed, and if they are, top-
down attentional surpluses mean that features may only be noted only because they 
feed on-going delusions. For example, a red feature may be noticed, not because of 
the prominence of the colour in the context, but because red is interpreted to mean 
power or some other such delusion (Reina, 2010).  
Eventually a tailored in depth cross-sectional study will be needed to pinpoint 
more specifics of causal relationships that the built environment have with 
schizophrenia, but evidence is already strong enough to justify assuming causality. In 
the same way, WHO advises caution with mobile phones because they are linked to 
the recent glioma epidemic, although the mechanism has not yet been identified 
(WHO and IARC, 2011). There is still every possibility that the removal of psychosis 
agonists and provisions intended to counteract deficit signs will not reverse 
schizophrenia, but because even minor environmental changes improves outcomes, a 
targeted and informed approach may yield remarkable results. Interventions may 
work directly or assist natural recovery. 
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AESTHETIC AND NATURAL ENGAGEMENT: Because positive bottom-up attention 
is engaged by aesthetics, good, beautiful, natural and especially awe-inspiring design 
may be restorative.  
Unfortunately, there’s no easy guideline that will ensure good and beautiful 
results, and just about any attempt to do so will incur extra costs in construction. This 
nebulous objective will also prove difficult to quantify because bottom-up attention is 
notoriously difficult to assess (Theeuwes et al., 2000) as are aesthetics, which are 
subjective. The objective of aesthetic appeal in architecture has a long tradition – 
perhaps older than man’s ability to build. It is the third of Vitruvius’ classical qualities 
of good building; “firmitas, utilitas, venustas,” that is, the importance of the delight 
that architecture can evoke (Vitrivius, circa 15BC).  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL GENEROSITY: The atrophy of bottom-up attention has a 
biological correlate: reduced synaptic plasticity. This affects learning, spatial 
cognition, information and logic handling, other cognitive functions and leads to 
dementia (Stephan et al., 2009, Schultz and Dickinson, 2000). Similarly, a socially 
and materially deprived environment has also been shown to cause synaptic atrophy – 
at least in rats, which are easier to observe and test ethically than humans (Hall et al., 
1998). Whether these losses occur for humans or if they are associated with the 
psychogenesis of schizophrenia is still unknown, but should be considered. And any 
positive or neutral enrichment of the environment should improve synaptic plasticity. 
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Environmental richness will therefore directly assist recovery, quite apart from the 
effects these efforts will have on attention systems. 
 
DEALING WITH TOP-DOWN SUPERFLUITY: Another approach to take in design 
intervention for psychotic conditions is to enrich spaces with positive affordances. 
Top-down attention is a mode that is concerned only for engagement. For this reason, 
designers should focus on what positive activity and entertainment the space can 
provide and on the redesign of the opposite – avoiding negative design language and 
passive environments.  
The biggest scale of architectural intervention will be at the level of typology. 
Typology is the classification of function according to appearance; (a house that looks 
like a house, a bank that looks like a bank etc.) the main function of typology is 
information: it informs people about the nature of the place they are visiting. As Kahn 
puts it, “rooms suggest their use without a name” (Kahn, 1971). Strong typology 
simplifies understanding, orientation and way-finding (Lynch, 1992). But not all 
typology is equal. Typology is symbolically and phenomenologically loaded, and so 
sensitivity needs to be given to types that may have negative meanings. Negative 
typologies may include prisons, hospitals, schools, courts, psychiatric facilities, 
seclusion rooms and other institutional buildings (Golembiewski, 2010).  
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Spatial arrangement within an environment is important because it has a direct 
effect on how people navigate and use the space. This becomes increasingly important 
as skills and cognitive abilities atrophy. For best effect, space should be logical, non-
repetitive and well marked with memorable objects and functions.  
Opportunities for engagement also exist at a smaller scale. We do not 
regularly engage in walls, and although we constantly do engage with the floor, it’s 
only because the ground beneath us is as ubiquitous as the prevalence of gravity. For 
the best part, we use the ground automatically, not as a matter of active engagement. 
We may be more inclined to engage in architectural elements if they offered us 
something more, like if they have to be negotiated in some way. Aalto had people 
engage with the floor by bringing it up closer to the eye level of a seated person – he 
created step-down living spaces. Walls would come alive with washable crayons and 
licence to scribble. It’s true that given a chance, some paranoid patients will use the 
opportunity to write threats and draw obscenities. But if these expressions were easily 
erased, even this kind of expression may still be helpful – at least it shows 
engagement and is a distraction from more harmful pursuits (Golembiewski, 2012b).  
We engage with objects, particularly interesting ones (is not engaging a 
synonym of interesting?) more than we do with basic building elements. Our bodies 
are designed to interact with movable objects and moving parts. Light switches, 
venetian blinds, knickknacks and furniture are the sorts of ordinary moving objects in 
the built environment that we regularly engage with. Architectural elements like these 
are designed for our bodies and actively invite engagement. We fill our homes, hotels 
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and workplaces with such things – probably because they fortify mental well-being. 
Ironically, the few places that are stripped of physical affordances are the places that 
need them most - prisons and psychiatric facilities - because such facilities are 
designed with safety as a priority over healing. This is exemplified by the overuse of 
anti-ligature devices - showerheads that don’t direct the water properly, doorknobs 
that can’t be grasped, tap-less basins, and furniture that is blind-bolted to the floor. 
Institutional strip-lighting is recessed and secured and blinds are often secured behind 
tempered glass. It is not unusual for anything that moves to be controlled remotely by 
nurses. The intention behind the installation of these components is clear; to restrict 
possible affordances for self-harm, but the result is that the affordances of the 
environment are restricted to an absolute minimum.  
Top-down attention (the relevant mode for the engagement in affordances) is 
driven by the tonic dopamine system, which is thought to be overexcited in 
schizophrenia (Heinz and Schlagenhauf, 2010, Grace et al., 2007). This means that 
psychotic patients have a stronger drive to engage than healthy people do, even 
though the drive may be masked by catatonic symptoms or deficit signs (Northoff et 
al., 2004, Sass and Parnas, 2001) The ‘irresistible’ drive to engage is demonstrated in 
the emotional image study detailed above (Golembiewski, 2012a). In this context, the 
removal of physical affordances is predicted to only frustrate patients and aggravate 
symptoms, if not the underlying pathology of the disorder. Given the removal of 
positive affordances, negative intentions are likely to become only more focused. It is 
important to note that even healthy people start having hallucinatory and delusional 
experiences when all affordances are taken away (Grassian, 1983, Weckowicz, 1957). 
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To counter this, Osmond (1957, 1958) (an experienced clinician and one of the 
leading authors on the subject of the design of the psychiatric milieu) recommended 
movable furniture, the provision of equipment to play music, to write etc. Now we 
should go further: design teams should actively think about the creation of positive 
affordances: the provision of a multisensory environment filled with relatively 
harmless but fun toys, sports equipment, drawing tools, opening windows, doors that 
have a pleasing sound when closed, adjustable lighting, heating and ventilation etc.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Ascertaining what is ‘bad’ and what is ‘good’ in an architectural context is not 
particularly difficult, but there’s no scientific method for such assertions. A level of 
subjectivity means that there will be specific exceptions for particular patients, 
particularly if they suffer from paranoia. For this reason, special care should be taken 
not to rely on neutral affordances because context will have a major bearing on this 
judgement. Exactly the same ‘neutral’ affordances can be taken as either positive or 
negative, depending on whether circumstances are judged as aversive (Freeman and 
Freeman, 2008).  
The image study (Northoff et al., 2004) used generic emotive photographs to solicit 
emotional responses, and so can architects and designers. Ulrich identified views of 
trees as positive (Ulrich and Parsons, 1990, Ulrich, 1991), and current projects that 
employ these concepts have been spectacularly successful (see figure 4). The ability 
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to engage with plants to touch them and lie under them is likely to be an even stronger 
positive affordance, although there is a reticence to plant trees in or around 
psychiatric facilities due to a risk of self-harm. Other architects have been 
experimenting with the inclusion of animal enclosures in their hospitals, also with 
wonderful feedback (see figure 5). But the salutary potential of architectural care goes 
far beyond trees, animals and emotive pictures. All positive affordances are likely to 
support the recovery from all mental illnesses, where negative ones appear to make 
the conditions worse. There are affordances everywhere, seats to sit on, apples to eat, 
windows to open, books to read. Most of these are positive, but care should be taken, 
because potential negative associations aren’t always obvious because of symbolic 
encoding (eg. the thirteenth room along a corridor) or linguistically associations (eg. 
the association between Lucifer and Lucite; a brand of transparent acrylic used in 
skylights) etc. 
Any opportunities that engage in personal choice are particularly important 
because they will contribute to a sense-of-self. But the most illusive opportunities are 
those that will have the strongest salutary effect (if any effect can be evoked at all) – 
sublimity and abundant beauty. The response to unintended delight is one of the most 
profound atrophies in schizophrenia and one, what’s more, that is currently 
untreatable using pharmacological interventions. 
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Figure 2, The Preloved Store, Camberwell. The richness of potentially negative 
symbolic associations in Camberwell is extraordinary. Could the high incidence of 
schizophrenia in the area reflect this? 
 
Figure 3, Black Katz Real Estate signs are common in Camberwell. Being rental 
agents, they probably have to evict people who don’t pay their rent. 
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Figure 4, A patient reads the paper in one of the abundantly green courtyards of Khoo 
Teck Hospital, Singapore (by CGC Architects). 
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Figure 5, Bates Smart and Billard Leece (architects) took great efforts to make the 
Royal Children’s Hospital in Melbourne a positive experience. They even have a 
meercat enclosure in the ambulatory waiting room. 
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